Edward Atkin v. Harvey Johnson by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-3-2011 
Edward Atkin v. Harvey Johnson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Edward Atkin v. Harvey Johnson" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1309. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1309 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
DLD-125        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4046 
 ___________ 
 
 EDWARD ATKIN, 
Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 HARVEY V. JOHNSON; PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-03982) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
 Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 25, 2011 
 
Before: BARRY, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  May 3, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Edward Atkin appeals from the order of the District Court granting Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss.  For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm.  See I.O.P. 
10.6.       
I. 
 In July 2006, Defendant State Trooper Harvey Johnson (“Johnson”), an African-
American male, stopped Atkin, a Caucasian male, while he was driving on the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike.  After stopping Atkin, Johnson issued him a traffic ticket for 
traveling in the left lane for twenty-five miles.  Atkin alleged that he was stopped shortly 
after leaving a rest stop and therefore could not have been traveling in the left lane for 
twenty-five miles.  Following an October 2006 jury trial in the Magisterial District Court, 
Atkin was convicted of unlawful use of a limited access highway.  Atkin filed a summary 
appeal of his conviction in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and was 
again found guilty of the violation in a summary appeal trial in March 2008.  Atkin 
appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the conviction. 
 In September 2009, Atkin filed in the District Court a complaint pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against Johnson and the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”), alleging that 
he was the victim of reverse discrimination.  Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 
and, in an August 2010 order, the District Court granted the motion.  The Court dismissed 
the claims against the PSP and Johnson – to the extent he was acting in his official 
capacity – for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
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Procedure 12(b)(1), on the ground that they were immune from suit under the Eleventh 
Amendment.  To the extent that Atkin alleged that Johnson acted in his individual 
capacity, the District Court dismissed the claim as untimely. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard 
of review of the District Court’s dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) is plenary.  Solis v. Local 234, Transp. Workers Union, 585 F.3d 172, 176 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  We also exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal on statute 
of limitations grounds.  Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries Ltd. P’ship, 126 F.3d 178, 
181 (3d Cir. 1997).  
 The District Court correctly determined that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims 
for damages against the PSP, a state agency that did not waive its sovereign immunity.  
See 71 P.S. §§ 61, 732-102; Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  To the extent Johnson was sued in his official capacity, he too was immune 
from suit.  Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).  Although 
Congress can abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity, it did not do so through the 
enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal law under which Atkin proceeds.  Quern v. 
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).   
 To the extent Atkin sued Johnson in his individual capacity, the claim was properly 
dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.  Claims brought pursuant to § 1983 are 
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subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.  Wilson v. Garcia, 
471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985).  The statute of limitations for a personal injury action in 
Pennsylvania is two years.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(2).  A cause of action 
accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that constitutes the 
basis of the cause of action.  Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 
F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).   Atkin’s action against Johnson accrued on July 22, 2006, 
the date of the traffic stop.  Because he filed the instant action in September 2009, he was 
beyond the statutory period, and thus his §1983 claim against Johnson is untimely.
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 As Atkin’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm.  See 
Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6 
                                                 
1
 We further agree with the District Court that the continuing violations doctrine 
does not apply to Atkin’s case.  See West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 
754-55 (3d Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
